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Investment treaty arbitration has unfolded rapidly in recent years. Some observations 
arising from analyses of arbitrator awards are highlighted below.1 They support broad 
conclusions that: 
 
• arbitrators reviewed a wide range of legislative, executive and judicial decisions 
but typically did not exercise judicial restraint in various ways associated with 
domestic and international courts; 
 
• arbitrators typically adopted expansive approaches to their authority and to 
investor entitlements to compensation, especially where the claimant had the 
nationality of a major Western capital-exporting state; and 
 
• decision-making power was highly concentrated among arbitrators, suggesting a 
need for closer scrutiny of how the most active individual arbitrators have 
expanded the meaning of investment treaties and corresponding principles of state 
liability. 
 
First, in virtually all of the 162 cases coded on the issue, arbitrators reviewed an 
executive measure and, in 37% and 44% of cases respectively, the dispute involved a 
domestic legislative or judicial decision. In at least half of the cases, arbitrators 
reviewed measures that appeared general in application – i.e. they affected actors 
other than the claimant – as opposed to measures that targeted the claimant 
specifically. 
 
Yet there was little evidence that arbitrators demonstrated restraint in ways commonly 
adopted by domestic and international courts.2 For example, there was little or no 
evidence of restraint due to the relative capacity of an executive agency, the role of a 
contractually agreed forum, or a treaty-based waiting period or fork-in-the-road.3 
Likewise, tribunals often reviewed domestic laws but there was no evidence of 
restraint at a general level due to the relative accountability of a legislature. Indeed, 
arbitrators were found to have invoked concepts associated with judicial restraint, 
 2
such as balancing and proportionality, more often when expanding than when limiting 
their authority. 
 
Second, the field has apparently offered arbitrators a fertile environment for creative 
lawyering alongside expansive approaches to their authority. This was evident in the 
coding of jurisdictional and substantive issues that involved, for example, the 
multiplication of corporate nationality as a possible gaming strategy by claimants, the 
definition of what qualifies as a protected investment, the risk of parallel proceedings, 
and the meaning of substantive standards, including, most notably, indirect 
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. 4  The tendency toward claimant-
friendly expansive interpretations increased significantly where the claimant was from 
the US, UK, France, or Germany.5  
 
Third, power was highly concentrated among arbitrators. For example, from a review 
of arbitrator resolutions of contested legal issues, it emerged that – of 247 individuals 
appointed as arbitrators – the 24 most active individuals executed about half of the 
issue resolutions and tended much more heavily toward approaches that expanded 
their authority. Other researchers have reported findings that 12 arbitrators were 
present on 60% of 263 ICSID tribunals and that 15 arbitrators were present on 55% of 
247 investment treaty tribunals.6 
 
These observations are descriptive, approximate, and subject to important limitations 
outlined elsewhere.7 They are presented here to give a sense of how investment treaty 
arbitration appears to have evolved due to the discretionary choices of arbitrators. 
 
In policy terms, the observations indicate a need for closer scrutiny by a range of 
actors – such as national associations of legislators or judges – of how arbitrators 
exercise their power and about whether their performance accords with considerations 
of public accountability, judicial restraint and basic even-handedness. In the 
meantime, states facing a reasonable prospect of investor claims, or seeking 
protection for non-Western investors, should systematically assess their anticipated 
exposure or protection and consider their options to avoid downside risks. 
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